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EVALUATING MICHIGAN'S GUILTY BUT 
MENTALLY ILL VERDICT: AN 
EMPIRICAL STUDY 
[A guilty but mentally ill verdict] is an atrocious idea for . . . 
we would still be in the sorry position of wanting to punish a 
mentally ill person for his sickness . 
-John W. Hinckley, Jr.' 
The criminal justice system has tilted too decidedly in favor of the 
rights of criminals and against the rights of society. [The guilty 
but mentally ill statute] would effectively eliminate the insanity 
defense . ... 
-Attorney General William French Smith 2 
On June 21, 1982, John W. Hinckley, Jr. was acquitted as not guilty 
by reason of insanity ("NGRl") 3 of an attempted assassination of the 
The authors would like to thank Dr. Harley Stock, Dr. Elissa Benedek, Mr. James Romans, 
and the entire staff of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry for their assistance in facilitating the 
collection of data for this Project, as well as Mr. Peter Ward for his assistance in the statistical 
analysis. The authors would also like to express their sincerest thanks to University of Michigan 
Law Professor David Chambers, whose patience and friendship provided much-needed encourage-
ment during the bleak moments of this Project. 
I. Hinckley, The Insanity Defense and Me, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1982, at 30. 
2. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1982, at Al8, col. 3. 
3. The modern insanity defense evolved from the mens rea doctrine of English common law 
which presumed that an illegal act was not a crime unless performed with criminal intent. See, 
e.g., Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1121 (K.B. 1603) ("No felony or murder can be com-
mitted without ... a felonious intent and purpose."); Williamson v. Norris, [1899] I Q.B. 7, 
14 ("[T]he general rule of English Law is, that no crime can be committed unless there is mens 
rea."); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("[I]f a man ... is not 
a free agent, or not making a choice, or unknowing of the difference between right and wrong, 
or not choosing freely, or not acting freely, he is outside the postulate of the law of punish-
ment."). See generally Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defense to Crime in English Criminal 
Law, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 105 (1924). 
The insanity defense was well-established by the sixteenth century. See generally Platt & Diamond, 
The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Develop-
ment in the United States: A Historical Survey, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1227 (1966). Even prior to 
1600, however, defendants considered insane were commonly offered royal pardons, 2 F. 
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 479-81 (2d ed. 1952), thereby reflecting 
a practice now recognized as a basic function of the insanity defense: sparing a criminally responsible 
but mentally ill defendant from punishment. See Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Develop-
ment and Contemporary Relevance, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 559, 559-64 (1972). 
The modern standard for the insanity defense in most American courts is some variation of 
the "M'Naghten rule," under which the defendant must be unable to distinguish right from 
wrong at the time he committed the criminal act. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
77 
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President of the United States. 4 Public dissatisfaction with the Hinckley 
verdict triggered a new national debate over the insanity defense. s One 
proposal for reforming the insanity defense is the adoption of an addi-
tional verdict, guilty but mentally ill ("GBMI"), to create a middle 
ground between guilty and NGRI. 6 
The first GBMI verdict was enacted by the Michigan legislature in 
1975. 7 Unlike the NGRI verdict, which exonerates defendants from 
criminal responsibility, 8 Michigan's GBMI verdict holds defendants 
45 (1967). During the twentieth century many states also added an "irresistible impulse" test 
as a second basis for finding a defendant insane. Id.; see also Note, Criminal Responsibility: 
Changes in the Insanity Defense and the "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Response, 21 WASHBURN 
L.J. 515, 517-20 (1982). 
For comprehensive histories of the origins of the insanity defense see S. GLUECK, MENTAL 
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 123-60 (1925); E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES 
OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 4-6, 54 (1817); 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 50-54 
(5th ed. 1942); 3 id. at 371-75 (5th ed. 1942); F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra, at 476-84; 
H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 52-64 (1954). 
4. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1982, at A18, col. 3. 
5. Attorney General William French Smith has urged Congress to eliminate the insanity defense. 
N. Y. Times, July 20, 1982, at Al 8, col. 3. According to Hinckley's jury foreman, the NORI 
verdict "should be changed in some way where the defendant gets mental help, gets help enough 
that he is not harmful to himself and society, and then be punished for what he has done wrong." 
Taylor, Too Much Justice, HARPER"S, Sept. 1982, at 56, 66. See Press, Camper, Clausen, Kasin-
dorf, Monroe, Shapiro & Taylor, The Insanity Plea On Trial, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 1982, at 
56, 57 ("[The insanity defense) has been controversial for years, and now the case of John Hinck-
ley Jr. may fundamentally alter it.") [hereinafter cited as Press); Leo, Is the System Guilty?, 
TIME, July 5, 1982, at 26 (" 'The verdict is the best thing that ever happened to the insanity 
plea because I think in the long run it's going to be abolished ... we're going to get rid of 
it.' ") (quoting legal sociologist Geoffrey Alpert); see also Lauter, Why Insanity Defense Is Breaking 
Down, NAT'L L.J., May 3, 1982, at I, col. I, at 2, col. I. ("[A]n Associated Press/NBC News 
poll showed that 87% of the public believed that too many murderers were using insanity pleas 
to avoid jail. Nearly 70% [of those sampled] would have banned insanity defenses altogether 
in murder cases."); Kaufman, The Insanity Plea on Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, § 6 
(Magazine), at I ("The [NORI] controversy touches on deeply felt American attitudes toward 
crime, punishment and personal responsibility .... "). 
6. MICH. HOUSE LEG. ANALYSIS SECTION, THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, 78th Leg., 
at 2 (July 18, 1975) [hereinafter cited as THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363). Many proponents 
of the GBMI statute view the GBMI verdict as a modified guilty verdict. Id.; see also Note, 
The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 188, 
198 n.75 (1978). The Michigan Court of Appeals has stated that the statute was enacted as an 
"in-between classification." See People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 246 (1977). 
7. See 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts 180. Michigan's GBMI verdict was codified in a number of 
statutes. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (1982) (defining the standard for a GBMI ver-
dict, setting the procedure for pleading and sentencing, and describing probation under a GBMI 
verdict); id. § 330.1400a (defining mental illness); id. § 768.29a(2) (requiring a GBMI instruction 
whenever the insanity defense is raised). For the purposes of this Project, the term "GBMI statute" 
shall include all the provisions necessary to implement a GBMI verdict. 
8. Id. § 330.2050(1). Historically, the insanity defense required no special plea and demanded 
no particular dispositional consequences; if the defense was successful, the defendant was simply 
released. Many states found, however, that this release procedure endangered public safety. Con-
sequently, even though an acquittee was not considered morally blameworthy for dangerous and 
antisocial acts, restraints upon his freedom were justified by a need to protect society. See, e.g., 
The Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800, 40 Geo. 3, ch. 94. (committing an individual acquitted by 
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criminally responsible for their acts. 9 A defendant found GBMI is 
sentenced like a defendant found guilty; however, a GBMI verdict 
theoretically guarantees the defendant any necessary mental health treat-
ment during the sentence. 10 
The primary purpose behind the Michigan GBMI verdict was to 
decrease the number of insanity acquittals. 11 Michigan legislators hoped 
to use the new verdict to prevent the early release of dangerous NGRI 
acquittees by offering Michigan juries a substitute for the insanity 
verdict. 12 
Since 1975, the Michigan statute has served as the prototype for GBMI 
legislation in other states. By January 1983, eight states had enacted 
versions of the GBMI verdict. 13 In addition, numerous other state 
legislatures and the federal government are presently considering the 
adoption of GBMI statutes. 14 
reason of insanity to the care and custody of the sovereign as guardian for incompetent members 
of society under the parens patriae doctrine). See generally J. FULLIN & F. FOSDAL, WISCONSIN 
STATE INSANITY DEFENSE COMMITTEE, GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT AND DISPOSITION 
(1980) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); see also F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra 
note 3, at 1233-37. 
Most states have implicitly adopted the principle underlying the Lunatics Act by providing 
for the automatic or quasi-automatic commitment of those acquitted as insane. According to 
a 1978 survey, ten states provide for automatic, indeterminate commitment following an NGRI 
verdict (Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
and Ohio), eleven states require only that the trial judge find that the release of the acquitted 
person would be dangerous (Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming), four states require a judicial finding of 
continuing insanity (Alabama, California, Hawaii, and Oregon), six states permit commitment 
at the judge's discretion without the necessity of any findings (Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota), and in two states the jury decides whether 
to commit (Kentucky and Mississippi). See Eule, The Presumption of Sanity: Bursting the Bubble, 
25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 657-59 (1978). Independent civil commitment is required by statute 
only in the District of Columbia and the remaining 18 states (Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). Even in these jurisdictions, 
the prosecution is often aided by a presumption of continuing insanity. Id. 
9. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982). 
10. Id. § 768.36(3). It is unlikely that Michigan's GBMI convicts actually receive this 
"guaranteed" treatment. See infra notes 49, 136 & 137 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. 
12. THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at 2. 
13. The states include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020(c) (Advance Leg. Serv. 1982); Con-
necticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 539.13 (West Supp. 1982); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 
27-1503 (Supp. 1982); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); 
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-36-2-3 (West Supp. 1982-1983); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 504.130 (Michie Supp. 1982); and New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (Supp. 1982). 
Prior to the adoption of the verdict by the Kentucky legislature, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
took the unusual step of recommending such adoption. Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 
97, 113 (Ky. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981). 
Two other states, Idaho and Montana, have completely abolished the insanity defense. IDAHO 
CODE § 18-207 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-101 to -401 (1981). 
14. Some of the states considering a GBMI statute include Florida, S. 323 (1980), H. 710 
(1980); Hawaii, H. 86 (1981), S. 2073-80 (1980); Maryland, S. 806 (1980), S. 1284 (1978); New 
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Because Michigan's GBMI statute has been in effect for several years, 
enough data exists to assess the statute's use and practical effect. The 
purpose of this Project is to evaluate the statute and thus provide 
guidance for those legislatures considering similar proposals. This Project 
concludes that the new verdict has completely failed in its intended 
purpose. Part I describes the statute's history, legislative purpose, and 
procedural mechanics. Part II analyzes the displacing effect of the GBMI 
verdict on other verdicts, and sets forth empirical data on the disparate 
characteristics of defendants who raise the insanity defense and are 
subsequently found GBMI, NGRI, or guilty. Part III analyzes the data 
and concludes that the statute has failed to achieve its goals. No fewer 
defendants are being found NGRI today than before the GBMI statute 
was enacted. Although the strong influence of Michigan's Center for 
Forensic Psychiatry in insanity-related defenses is one reason to believe 
that the GBMI verdict may have a different effect in other states, in 
Michigan it is clear that the statute has merely substituted a new name 
tag for certain defendants who, in the absence of the new statute, prob-
ably would have been found guilty. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GBMI VERDICT 
A. Adjudication of the Mentally Ill Defendant Prior 
to the GBMI Statute 
Until recently, adjudication of the mentally ill defendant was not 
an issue in the Michigan courts. Defendants found guilty - regardless 
of manifestations of mental illness - were sentenced no differently 
from other defendants convicted of crimes. On the other hand, defend-
ants found NGRI were subject to Michigan's automatic-commitment 
statute which required immediate and indefinite commitment to a state 
Hampshire, S. 169 (1979), S. 51 (1981); New York, S. 11765 (1980), S. 4013 (1979), S. 7185 
(1978), H. 9705 (1978); Ohio, S. 297 (1979); and Pennsylvania, S. 171 (1981), H. I 162 (1979). 
Congress presently has a number of bills before it that would create some variation of a GBMI 
verdict. See, e.g., S. 1106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 2672, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); 
H.R. 5395, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6653, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6702, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6709, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6717, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6718, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6726, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); 
H.R. 6742, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6947, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6949, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
In addition, a Reagan Administration Task Force has recommended the adoption of a GBMI 
verdict: 
The Attorney General should support or propose legislation that would create an 
additional verdict in federal criminal cases of "guilty but mentally ill" modeled after 
the recently passed Illinois statute and establish a federal commitment procedure for 
defendants found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity. 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL REPORT 
54 (1981). 
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mental institution. 1 5 Some observers believe that the stigma associated 
with mental health treatment 16 and the prospect of indeterminate con-
finement in a mental hospital often deterred defendants from raising 
the defense. 11 The automatic commitment of those who successfully 
raised the defense seemed to ensure public safety through incarceration 
and involuntary hospitalization, and consequently generated little public 
concern over the adjudication of mentally ill defendants. 18 
During the 1970's, however, the constitutionality of statutes permitting 
the automatic, indefinite commitment of defendants found NGRI was 
challenged in state and federal courts. 19 Many of these challenges pro-
duced major changes in the procedural and substantive rights of the 
mentally ill. 20 In People v. McQuillan, 21 the Michigan Supreme Court 
15. Act of July 12, 1966, Pub. Act No. 266, § 767-27b, 1966 Mich. Pub. Acts 380 (repealed 
1974) (specifying that any person found NORI shall be immediately committed to the Depart-
ment of Mental Health for treatment in a state hospital and released only after an evaluation 
and recommendation for release from the Center for Forensic Psychiatry). 
16. "A strong social stigma remains attached to defendants who seek or accept mental health 
care." Interview with Dr. Elissa P. Benedek, M.D., Director of Research and Training, Center 
for Forensic Psychiatry, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Sept. 4, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Benedek 
Interview]. 
17. Letter from Thomas C. Parker, Chief Trial Attorney for the Office of the Defender 
in Grand Rapids, Michigan, to the authors (Aug. 20, 1982) ("In many cases, such a stigma 
is attached to the 'mentally ill' section [of corrections] by the judge, or corrections department, 
that [the) defense will elect not to even mention [a mentally ill defense].") (on file with the 
Journal of Law Reform); Lauter, supra note 5, at II (observing that when New York state of-
fered prisoners with mental problems a choice between staying in prison and admission to a 
mental hospital, almost 90% took prison). 
18. See J. FULLIN & F. FOSDAL, supra note 8, at 3. 
19. The parens patriae doctrine was eroded by decisions holding that an individual's con-
stitutional right to liberty and to avoid the stigma associated with mental health care may only 
be abrogated upon proof of present mental illness and dangerousness. See, e.g., O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); 
Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 
F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); see also Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) 
(striking down ex parte summary detention of insane persons as violative of due process), rev'd 
on other grounds, 651 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1981); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. 
Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473, judgment reinstated, 
379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 
957 (1975), judgment reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
20. s·everal decisions held that proof of present mental illness and dangerousness had to be 
produced under courtroom procedures which offered the defendant due process rights equivalent 
to those enjoyed by individuals civilly committed. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 
(1971); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 
1113 (D. Hawaii 1976). 
In some jurisdictions the dangerousness finding must be supported by proof of specific and 
recent overt acts or threats of violence against oneself or others. See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 
407 F. Supp. 509, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1975). In addition, liberty cannot be denied for treatment 
purposes where treatment is not actually provided, or when the individual does not need custodial 
treatment. See, e.g., Jackson, 406 U.S. at 715; Bolton, 395 F.2d at 642. Finally, the fact that 
a person has been accused of a crime or has served a criminal sentence is an insufficient basis 
for abrogating these rights, because the purpose of the commitment is rehabilitation, not punish-
ment. See, e.g., Jackson, 406 U.S. at 724; Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
21. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974). 
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struck down the state's automatic-commitment statute as a denial of 
equal protection because it provided substantially different procedures 
and standards for the commitment of NORI defendants than for indi-
viduals civilly committed. 22 Under the McQui/lan holding, NORI def end-
ants, like individuals subject to civil commitment:2 3 are entitled to a 
full hearing to determine mental illness, dangerousness, or incompetence 
to meet basic needs. 24 The court stipulated that all previously committed 
NORI defendants were to be evaluated and released if they did not 
qualify for civil commitment. 25 
In the year following the McQuillan decision, many of the 270 patients 
held under NORI verdicts were released without hearings because hos-
pital or state officials believed that they could not prove that these 
patients met the criteria for civil commitment. 26 Shortly after their 
release, two of these patients committed violent crimes. 21 Public outcry 
over the release of such dangerous mental patients28 prompted the 
22. Id. at 535-36, 547, 221 N.W.2d at 580-81, 586 ("Equal protection demands that dif-
ferences in treatment of classes be based on a rational basis."). 
The McQuillan court ·stated that an NGRI verdict justified a period of temporary detention 
of up to 60 days for medical observation, but that "upon completion of the examination and 
observation, due process and equal protection require that a defendant found not guilty by reason 
of insanity must have the benefit of commitment and release provisions equal to those available 
to those civilly committed." Id. at 547, 221 N.W.2d at 586. 
Michigan's mental health statutes define a "person requiring treatment" as one who is mentally 
ill and (1) can be expected within the near future to seriously injure himself or another person 
or (2) is unable to attend to his basic physical needs. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (1982). 
23. The procedures for these groups are substantially similar but not identical. Even after 
McQuillan, defendants found NGRI remained subject to temporary detention without a prior 
hearing. See supra note 22. In addition, the McQuil/an court never discussed whether the NGRI 
defendant's equal protection rights were violated by the requirement - not present in civil commit-
ment cases - that discharge be preceded by an evaluation and recommendation for release by 
the Forensic Center. 392 Mich. at 543 n.9, 221 N.W.2d at 584 n.9. See Morris, Mental Illness 
and Criminal Commitment in Michigan, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 2, 38-39 (1971) (arguing that 
there should be statutes "equating mental patients acquitted of crime by reason of insanity with 
other civil mental patients in all respects - including treatment, release, and discharge .... ") 
(emphasis in original); see also Hamann, The Confinement and Release of Persons Acquitted 
by Reason of Insanity, 4 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 55 (1966); Note, Releasing Criminal Defendants Ac-
quitted and Committed Because of Insanity: The Need for Balanced Administration, 68 YALE 
L.J. 293 (1958) (advocating reform in procedural rules for handling release). 
24. 392 Mich. at 547, 221 N.W.2d at 586. 
25. Id. 
26. Following the McQuillan decision, approximately 150 individuals were released as no longer 
ill or dangerous. Schwartz, Moving Backward Confidently, 54 MICH. ST. B.J. 847, 848 (1975). 
27. Diebolt & Mitchell, Killer, Freed as Sane, Held in Wife's Slaying, Detroit Free Press, 
April 15, 1975, at Al, col. 3, at AS, col. I. One of the released patients, John McGee, had 
recently won an NGRI acquittal on a murder charge. Several weeks after his release he brutally 
killed his wife. McGee was subsequently found guilty of first degree murder. Mitchell, McGee 
Convicted: Faces Life Term for Killing Wife, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 8, 1976, at A3, col. 2, 
at Al 1, col. 1. 
28. McGee's release, see supra note 27, was so strongly criticized that Justice Williams, the 
author of the McQuillan decision, felt it necessary to respond publicly: "The Supreme Court 
did not free John McGee. The Supreme Court [merely] interpreted the law (which the court 
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Michigan legislature to develop an alternative to the insanity verdict 
for defendants in need of mental health care. The result of this effort 
was a proposal to add a guilty but mentally ill verdict. 29 
B. Legislative History of the GBMI Statute 
Proponents of the OBMI statute argued that it would protect society 
by hospitalizing and incarcerating defendants who might otherwise be 
found NORI and subsequently released, pursuant to McQuil/an. 30 
Legislators anticipated that the OBMI verdict would reduce the incidence 
of NORI acquittals. They emphasized that a defendant found OBMI 
would be incarcerated because of conviction, not insanity, and would 
therefore be unable to petition for release under McQuillan on the 
grounds that he was not civilly committable. 31 Advocates of the new 
verdict also noted that the OBMI convict, unlike the NORI acquittee, 
would have to serve a definite sentence in either a mental health or 
correctional facility. 32 
did not write) as to release and commitment procedures .... " Diebolt, supra note 27, at AS, 
col. 2 (parenthetical in original quotation). 
Concern over the abuse of the insanity defense was also precipitated by studies from the Forensic 
Center. One study of NORI patients indicated that only 20% were legitimately mentally ill, and 
thus not culpable. Another 50% had some neurotic or psychotic tendencies but no causal relation-
ship could be discerned between their mental states and the crimes they committed, and thus 
they should have been found culpable. The remaining 300/'o of the NORI patients studied showed 
no signs of mental illness. A. Robey & E. Pogany, The NGRI Commitment and McQuillan 
(Sept. 15, 1974) (unpublished Department of Mental Health study) (on file with the Journal 
of Law Reform). 
29. THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at I (indicating that a major goal 
of the OBMI statute was to prevent the release of persons found NORI and thereby prevent 
a potential threat to public safety). According to Representative Rosenbaum, the OBMI statute 
was specifically designed "to circumvent the McQuillan decision." Mental Health; Guilty But 
Mentally Ill: Hearings on H.B. 4363, 78th Leg. (1975) (statement of Representative Rosenbaum). 
Most commentators acknowledge that the Michigan OBMI statute was a direct outgrowth of 
the McQuillan decision. See Watkins, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Reasonable Compromise for 
Pennsylvania, 85 DICK. L. REV. 289 (1981); Note, supra note 6, at 188; cf. Robey,·Gui/ty But 
Mentally Ill, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 374 (1978) ("If society feels generally, as 
it has in Michigan, that the new mental health and criminal rulings are eroding its protection 
against crime, a more structured disposition of the mentally ill offender may become 
commonplace."). 
30. THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at I. 
31. Id. at 2. 
32. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982). Many proponents of the statute main-
tained that defendants would abuse a OBMI verdict without a mandatory minimum sentence 
because OBMI would offer the best possibility for early release. See THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. 
H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at 2. This seems unlikely given the strong stigma attached to defendants 
who seek or accept mental health care. See supra notes 16 & 17. Moreover, a OBMI defendant 
required to serve a minimum sentence may have no incentive to cooperate in psychiatric treat-
ment, thus creating a high incidence of recidivism. See THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, 
supra note 6, at 2. No empirical research has been done comparing recidivism rates of OBMI 
defendants with those of defendants found guilty. 
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Legislators supporting the statute further contended that it would 
greatly simplify jury deliberation. 33 Because there is a tendency for jurors 
to assume that a defendant who commits a particularly offensive crime 
"must be insane," juries often find such defendants NORI. 34 Jurors, 
it was believed, mistakenly assumed that a dangerous person found 
NORI would be committed for many years. The OBMI verdict was 
designed to give juries an alternative35 that guaranteed that the defendant 
would not be released before a minimum term had been served. 36 
33. THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at 2. Critics argued that the GBMI 
verdict would actually confuse juries because the issue of insanity and legal responsibility was diffi-
cult enough without adding a new variable. Id.; see also Note, supra note 6, at 198-99. Critics 
also agreed that juries would be confused by use of the word but in the phrase "guilty but 
mentally ill," rather than the syntactically correct and, because the former implies that the GBMI 
verdict is a verdict of diminished responsibility when in effect it is not. See Schwartz, supra 
note 26, at 848 (arguing that a GBMI verdict is no different from the standard guilty verdict 
because no intermediate degree of criminal culpability is attached to the former by the addition 
of the words "but mentally ill"); see also People v. Long, 86 Mich. App. 676, 684, 273 N. W .2d 
519, 523 (1978), aff'd sub nom. People v. Booth, 414 Mich. 343, 324 N.W.2d 741 (1982) ("In 
its substance, and in its penal consequences, a plea of guilty but mentally ill is a guilty plea."); 
Letter from Ralph Slovenko, Professor of Law and Psychiatry at Wayne State University, to 
the New York Times Editor, reprinted in N.Y. Times, July 12, 1982, at A14, col. 4 ("[Juries], 
thinking that G.B.M.1. is a compromise or middle ground, are hoodwinked. The verdict 'guilty 
but mentally ill' could just as well be 'guilty but cirrhosis.' ") [hereinafter cited as Slovenko 
Letter]. A number of writers have argued that juries may abuse the GBMI verdict by compromising 
between guilty and NORI. Corrigan & Grano, 1976 Annual Survey of Michigan Law: Criminal 
Law, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 473, 479 (1977); Note, Insanity - Guilty But Mentally Ill- Diminished 
Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 351, 374 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, An Aggregate Approach to Madness]; Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill: 
An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471, 492 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Note, An Historical Analysis]. Such jury abuse has not, however, been shown. See id. 
The jury compromise argument has been raised on the appellate level in only two cases. The 
appellate panels rejected the argument in both cases, stating that they did "not find evidence 
of the jury being misled into returning a compromise verdict or of being improperly instructed." 
See People v. Linzey, 112 Mich. App. 374, 377, 315 N.W.2d 550, 551 (1981); People v. Thomas, 
96 Mich. App. 210,221,292 N.W.2d 523, 527 (1980). One proposed solution for this confusion 
is the adoption of a bifurcated trial where the jury would first determine the defendant's criminal 
responsibility; if the defendant was found guilty, the jury would separately determine the ques-
tion of mental illness. See Brief in Support of Application for Leave to Appeal at 9, People 
v. Boyd, No. 68636 (Mich., filed Jan. 5, 1982); cf Kaufman, supra note 5, at 20 (proposing 
bifurcated trial in which jury determines guilt and judge decides whether defendant possessed 
the mental capacity necessary to warrant punishment as a criminal). 
34. See THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at 2. Many commen~ators believe 
that the decision in an insanity acquittal has more to do with the jury's state of mind than 
with the defendant's. See, e.g., Lauter, supra note 5, at 2, col. 2 ("When faced, for example, 
with a woman accused of infanticide, 'we do not want to understand the thing; it is so horrible 
we say, "It's crazy." ' ") (quoting psychiatrist Thomas Szasz). 
35. Many GBMI critics believe that the verdict is a superfluous alternative. An insane defendant 
should be acquitted, they note, because "such a defendant did not know that an offense was 
wrong, or could not resist the impulse to commit the offense .... " THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. 
H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at 2. Conversely, defendants who knew that an offense was wrong 
and could have resisted committing the offense should be found guilty. Mental illness less than 
insanity should thus be irrelevant at trial. If a convict is mentally ill, psychiatric treatment is 
already required by law. Id.; see Schwartz, supra note 26, at 848-49; Note, supra note 6, at 198. 
36. THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at 2. The emphasis of the com-
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Thus, the legislature outlined the purpose of the GBMI statute as 
twofold: to protect society from dangerous individuals who might other-
wise be found NGRI and subsequently released under McQuillan, 37 
and to simplify jury deliberations in cases involving the insanity 
defense. 38 To achieve these purposes, legislators designed the GBMI 
verdict to allow juries to provide mentally ill defendants with mental 
health treatment while ensuring penal detention of defendants follow-
ing their in-patient treatment for mental illnesses. 
C. Operation of the GBMI Statute 
Under existing law, a defendant must be found NGRI if, as a result 
of "mental illness" or "mental retardation," he "lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law." 39 The GBMI statute, 
by contrast, requires that a defendant be adjudicated GBMI if it is 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) is guilty of an offense, 
mentary to the recommendation of the Federal Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime 
is almost exclusively on the soothing effect a GBMI statute would have on juries: 
[T)here are defendants who appear to be suffering from mental illness but from a type 
of mental illness that may not significantly effect their ability to obey the law. Such 
a person presents juries with the difficult choice of either making a finding of guilty, 
even though the jury may feel compassion because of the defendant's mental problems, 
or not guilty by reason of insanity, even though the person appears to be able to appre-
ciate the criminal nature of his conduct . . . . 
[A GBMI statute] would enable federal juries to recognize that some defendants are 
mentally ill but that their mental illness is not related to the crime they committed or 
their culpability for it; It would also enable a jury to be confident that a defendant 
who is incarcerated as a result of its verdict will receive treatment for that illness while 
confined. 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 54. 
A common objection to this aspect of the GBMI statute is that in difficult cases juries will 
use it as an "intermediate verdict or 'escape hatch.' " Robey, supra note 29, at 380. Because 
the charge to the jury includes the post-verdict disposition of the defendant, the jury's concern 
that the defendant might be released following his 60-day observation period could lead them 
to a GBMI verdict even though they believe he was not culpable. Id. 
37. See THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at I. The Michigan Supreme 
Court, in its only case to date dealing with the GBMI statute, stated that the Michigan legislature's 
goal in passing the statute was to assure supervised mental health treatment for the mentally 
ill persons convicted under state law, in the "humane hope of restoring their mental health." 
People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 663-64 (1980). This seems disingenuous. The statute does 
not address a defendant's present mental condition and need for treatment. Instead, it requires 
the jury to find the defendant mentally ill, but not legally insane, at the time of the offense. 
This time differential implies that the purpose of the GBMI statute was qot to safeguard the 
mental health of defendants, but to encourage juries to adopt GBMI verdicts to ensure that 
dangerous people would be confined from the public. 
38. See THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at I. 
39. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.2la(l) (1982). The Michigan definition of insanity is 
essentially the same as the model definition originally proposed by the American Law Institute . 
. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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(2) was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense, and 
(3) was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that offense. 40 
The new statute defines mental illness as "a substantial disorder of 
thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capa-
city to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands 
of life. " 41 
A defendant must raise the insanity defense to be found GBMI. 42 
Once the insanity defense is raised, the defendant must be ref erred 
to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry ("Forensic Center")43 for a 
40. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.31(1) (1982). 
41. Id. § 330. 1400a. 
The statutory definitions of "insanity" and "mental illness" have been attacked in a number 
of cases. Several defendants have argued that the definitions overlap and that the irrational 
classifications that result are a violation of the defendant's equal protection rights. See, e.g., 
People v. Rone (On Second Remand), 109 Mich. App. 702, 716, 311 N.W.2d 835, 841 (1981); 
People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich. App. 468, 472, 280 N.W.2d 565, 566 (1979); People v. Soma, 88 
Mich. App. 351, 359-60, 276 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1979). Some commentators agree: 
[I)t is hard to imagine "a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly 
impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality or ability to cope with the 
ordinary demands of life" that may not also be a substantial incapacity "either to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of ... conduct or to conform ... conduct to the requirements 
of law." 
Note, supra note 6, at 196; accord Note, supra note 3, at 550. 
The Michigan Supreme Court put this argument to rest: "We think this classification rationally 
furthers the legislative object of providing supervised mental health treatment and care to guilty 
but mentally ill defendants who are placed on probation." People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 
664, 288 N.W.2d 909, 919 (1980). See also People v. Darwall, 82 Mich. App. 652, 661, 267 
N.W.2d 472, 476 (1978); People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 246, 263 N.W.2d 44, 45 (1977); 
People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. at 360,276 N.W.2d at 896; Note, An Historical Analysis, supra 
note 33, at 491. Cases since McLeod have summarily rejected similar constitutional attacks. See, 
e.g., People v. Rone (On First Remand), IOI Mich. App. 8ll, 825,300 N.W.2d 705, 712 (1980). 
Several other constitutional arguments have been aimed at the GBMI verdict; all have been 
rejected by the courts. For example, it has been argued that the GBMI statute violates the "title-
object" clause of the Michigan Constitution, which declares that "rio law embrace more than 
one object, which shall be expressed in its title." MICH. CONST. art. 4, 1 24. This argument 
was rejected. See People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 199, 274 N.W.2d 17, 19 (1978); accord 
People v. Wilsie, 96 Mich. App. 350, 354, 292 N.W.2d 145, 147 (1980). Courts have also re-
jected arguments that the combination of NGRI and GBMI verdicts unconstitutionally shifts 
the burden of proof to the defendant, see People v. Darwall, 82 Mich. App. at 659, 267 N.W.2d 
at 475, and that a finding of GBMI is inconsistent with the intent requirement of first-degree 
murder, see People v. Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 220, 222, 29'.' N.W.2d 523, 528 (1980); see also 
People v. Linzey, 112 Mich. App. 374, 378, 315 N.W.2d 550, 552 (1981). 
42. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(l) (1982). A defendant intending to raise the in-
sanity defense must notify the prosecutor not less than 30 days before the date set for the trial 
or "at such other time as the court directs." Id. 
Defendants have claimed, unsuccessfully, that NGRI and GBMI are irrational classifications 
because the GBMI verdict may only arise when the defense of insanity is raised. People v. Rone 
(On First Remand), IOI Mich. App. 811, 825, 300 N.W.2d 705, 712 (1980); People v. Darwall, 
82 Mich. App. 652, 661, 267 N.W.2d 472, 476 (1978); People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 
245, 263 N.W.2d 44, 44-45 (1977). 
43. The Forensic Center.was established in 1966 and is a facility of the Department of Mental 
Health. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 330.1128 (1982). The Center is a maximum security 
facility located ten miles south of Ann Arbor, Michigan on the grounds of the Ypsilanti Regional 
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psychological examination of criminal responsibility. 44 At trial, the judge 
must instruct the jury as to the verdicts of guilty, GBMI, NORI, and 
not guilty. 45 
A defendant may also plead GBMI. 46 Two elements must exist for 
Psychiatric Hospital. The Center handles patients on an inpatient and outpatient basis. A large 
part of the Center's work involves clinical evaluations performed at the request of Michigan 
state courts. The evaluations include competency to stand trial, criminal responsibility, and the 
necessity of involuntary hospitalization following an NORI verdict. See Appendix B, Chart A. 
44. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(2) (1982). The examination may be conducted either 
in the jail in which the defendant is being held pending trial or at the Forensic Center. Id. If 
the defendant is free on bail, he must make himself available for examination; failure to appear 
for the examination may result in commitment without a hearing. Id. Michigan law requires 
that the Forensic Center's evaluation be sent to the prosecutor and defense counsel. Id. § 768.20a(6). 
In addition, the defendant is entitled to an independent psychiatric evaluation at his own expense 
or, if indigent, at the expense of the county. Id. § 768.20a(3). The prosecuting attorney is also 
e~titled to an independent examination of the defendant. 
The criminal responsibility evaluation typically includes two parts. First, the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory ("MMPI") is administered. The MMPI compares characteristics 
and behavior of the defendant to previous research which has identified and classified similar 
characteristics and behavior for other individuals. The MMPI also identifies subjects attempting 
to "cheat" in an attempt to appear insane. See 1. GRAHAM, THE MMPI: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
(1977). In addition to the MMPI, a member of the Forensic Center staff conducts an interview 
with the defendant. The interview consists of the defendant's personal history and account of 
the alleged crime. Based upon the MMPI and interview, the staff member typically declares the 
defendant to be either criminally responsible or not responsible. See Appendix B, Chart A. 
Michigan's use of the state-operated Forensic Center is not uniformly followed by other states. 
Indiana, which possesses GBMI and insanity statutes very similar to Michigan's, requires that 
the court appoint two or three "disinterested" _psychiatrists to examine the defendant. IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-36-2-2 (Supp. 1982). 
45. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.29a(2) (1982). The Michigan courts have recognized 
that a GBMI instruction must be given whenever the insanity defense is presented at trial. People 
v. Ritsema, 105 Mich. App. 602,612,307 N.W.2d 380, 385 (1981) (holding that a GBMI instruc-
tion must be given even if the defendant does not want the instruction); People v. Mikulin, 
84 Mich. App. 705, 709, 270 N.W.2d 500, 501-02 (1978) (stating that a GBMI instruction must 
be given). 
The content of the instructions to the jury has also been litigated on the appellate level. The 
defendant on appeal has usually argued that the judge should not have instructed the jury on 
the post-verdict disposition of the defendant under the NORI and GBMI verdicts. The Michigan 
courts have generally upheld the right of the trial judge to instruct as to the post-trial effect 
of these verdicts. See People v. Rone (On Second Remand), 109 Mich. App. 702, 712-13, 311 
N.W.2d 835, 840 (1981); see also People v. Linzey, 112 Mich. App. 374, 378, 315 N.W.2d 550, 
552 (1981); People v. Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 210, 222, 292 N.W.2d 523, 528 (1980); People 
v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326, 330, 287 N.W.2d 223, 224-25 (1979). Contra People v. Samuelson, 
75 Mich. App. 228, 234, 254 N.W.2d 849, 852 (1977). 
Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions include instructions for the disposition of defendants found 
NORI or GBMI. The GBMI disposition instruction reads: 
(14) If you find the defendant committed the crime while responsible but mentally 
ill, then you may return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. This verdict may be of 
the crime charged [or any lesser included offense]. 
(15) In most respects a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is the same as a verdict of 
guilty. The defendant may be imprisoned for the same period of time as he would if 
he w_ere found guilty. [Alternatively, he could be placed on probation for a period of 
time the same as or greater than he would be if found guilty]. The distinction is that 
the verdict of guilty but mentally ill imposes upon the Department of Corrections an 
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the judge to accept a plea of GBMI: the defendant must (1) assert 
the insanity defense and (2) waive his right to a trial. 47 
After accepting a GBMI plea or after conviction under a GBMI ver-
dict, the court "shall impose any sentence which could be imposed 
pursuant to law" for the particular offense. 48 If the defendant is sen-
obligation to provide appropriate psychiatric treatment during the period of imprison-
ment or while the defendant is on probation. 
Special Committee on Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, State Bar of Michigan, Michigan 
Criminal Jury Instructions, CJI 7:8:10 (1977) (brackets in original to allow for trial court variance). 
The GBMI instruction has also been used to correct an erroneous NGRI instruction under 
the rationale that, because a proper GBMI instruction was given and because the jury returned 
a guilty verdict, no mental illness existed; therefore, the defendant could not have been found 
NGRI. See People v. Crawford, 89 Mich. App. 30, 36, 279 N.W.2d 560, 564 (1979). Contra People 
v. Girard, 96 Mich. App. 594, 602, 293 N.W.2d 639, 643 (1980). 
46. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(2) (1982). 
47. Id. A judge may not accept a GBMI plea until he has examined the reports prepared 
by the Forensic Center and has held a hearing on the issue of the defendant's mental state at 
the time of the crime. Id. The reports prepared by the Forensic Center are to be made part 
of the record. Id. Failure to obtain an insanity examination invalidates the GBMI plea. People 
v. Seefeld, 95 Mich. App. 197, 199, 290 N.W.2d 124, 125 (1980). The Forensic Center report 
need not conclude that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to support 
a GBMI plea. People v. Bazzi, 113 Mich. App. 606, 609, 318 N.W.2d 484, 484-85 (1981); cf. 
People v. Fultz, 111 Mich. App. 587, 314 N.W.2d 702 (1981) (holding that a trial court must 
make an explicit finding that the defendant was not insane at the time of the offense before 
accepting a GBMI plea). 
The Michigan Supreme Court has also held that a plea of GBMI, like a guilty plea, requires 
direct examination of the defendant; however, if the defendant forgets details of the crime, the 
factual basis for the plea may be established by reference to transcripts of a preliminary examina-
tion. See People v. Booth, 414 Mich. 343, 348-49, 324 N.W.2d 741, 743 (1982). The trial court 
may allow external evidence to establish an adequate factual basis for the plea. Bazzi, 113 Mich. 
App. at 608-09, 318 N.W.2d at 485. 
48. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982). The Michigan Supreme Court has held 
that prior to sentencing, the trial judge mtist obtain a report from the Forensic Center on the 
defendant's present mental condition, at least in those cases in which the defendant is placed 
on probation. People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 658, 288 N.W.2d 909, 917 (1980). The court 
found the requirement of an examination to be implied in the probation section of the statute, 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(4) (1982): 
This statutory provision specifically requires the sentencing judge who places on pro-
bation a defendant who has been found guilty but mentally ill to make treatment a 
condition of probation upon the recommendation of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. 
Practically speaking, no such recommendation could be made until the center has been 
afforded the opportunity to evaluate the defendant's mental health and to determine 
the need for treatment, if any. 
McLeod, 407 Mich. at 658, 288 N.W.2d at 917. Although the court based this language on the 
probation section of the statute, the explicit holding makes no distinction between incarceration 
and probation. One court has distinguished between incarceration and probation and held that 
incarceration requires no such report. People v. Linzey, 112 Mich. App. 376, 379-80, 315 N.W.2d 
550, 553 (1981). 
The trial court may also cure any inconsistent verdicts at the sentencing stage. People v. Philpot, 
98 Mich. App. 257, 296 N.W.2d 229 (1980). In Philpot, the defendant was found guilty of assault 
with intent to commit murder and guilty but mentally ill of possession of a firearm in the com-
mission of a felony. The court held that interference with the jury verdicts was permissible in 
this case, and that the proper remedy was "to add on the 'but mentally ill' language to his 
assault conviction." Id. at 260, 296 N.W.2d at 230. 
In contrast to Philpot, the appellate panel in People v. Blue, 114 Mich. App. 137, 318 N.W.2d 
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tenced to the Department of Corrections on a GBMI verdict or plea, 
he must be evaluated and receive "such treatment as is psychiatrically 
indicated," in either the Department of Corrections or the Department 
of Mental Health. 49 If treatment is not indicated or when, after treat-
498 (1982), did not cure inconsistent verdicts, but instead held that, due to concurrent sentences, 
the inconsistency was of no significance. See id. at 142, 318 N.W.2d at 499-500. 
49. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982). 
A temporarily successful challenge to the GBMI statute involved the claim that the Depart-
ment of Corrections would be unable to provide the treatment required under the statute. After 
holding a hearing on the ability of the Department of Corrections and the Department of Mental 
Health to provide treatment, a Michigan trial court found the GBMI statute "legally inert" due 
to the inability of the departments to provide treatment. See People v. McLeod, No. 76-01672 
(Detroit Recorder's Ct., Mich., Sept. 21, 1976), rev'd, 407 Mich. 632,288 N.W.2d 909 (1980). 
To determine whether the defendant would receive the necessary treatment, the trial judge took 
testimony from a psychiatrist with the Department of Corrections, a psychiatrist with the Depart-
ment of Mental Health and from a private practitioner. 
According to the trial court's findings, there was only one full-time psychiatrist for a prison 
population of 12,000 in the Department of Corrections. Treatment consisted mainly of crisis 
intervention, generally only for those patients deemed psychotic or suicidal. The Department 
of Corrections psychiatrist indicated that the defendant would come to the doctor's attention 
only if the defendant was an extreme management problem. People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 
667-68 n.5, 288 N.W.2d 909, 921 n.5 (1980) (Levin, J., concurring). On the basis of this testimony, 
the trial court held the GBMI statute unconstitutional. 
The Michigan Supreme Court considered the trial court's ruling premature and stated that 
it was "logically impossible" to say that treatment will not be provided because the needs of 
the defendant cannot be determined until the defendant is evaluated. See People v. McLeod, 
407 Mich. at 651-54, 288 N.W.2d at 914-15. The holding in McLeod parallels a number of court 
of appeals rulings that any evaluations of the availability of treatment by the sentencing judge 
are premature; if the treatment is not provided, the proper remedy is a writ of mandamus to 
the Department of Corrections or the Department of Mental Health. See, e.g., People v. Linzey, 
112 Mich. App. 374, 377, 315 N.W.2d 550,552 (1981); People v. Willsie, 96 Mich. App. 350, 
354-55, 292 N.W.2d 145, 147 (1980); People v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326,331,287 N.W.2d 
223, 225 (1979); People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 362, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979). 
Ironically, the supreme court in McLeod did not condemn the sentencing court's review of 
the proposed treatment, but only objected to the procedure used by the trial court in evaluating 
the future treatment: 
In order for the sentencing court to have properly made the findings it purported to 
make concerning the actual availability and provision of treatment for defendant, it 
must first have had the responsible departments before it as parties to a legal proceeding, 
represented by counsel, and afforded a full and fair opportunity to develop a factual 
record to determine at least the following: 
1) Whether treatment was psychiatrically indicated for defendant; 
2) If so, the type and length of the treatment that was psychiatrically indicated; 
3) Whether that treatment was being provided or would be provided; and 
4) If not, the reasons for the failure to provide such treatment. 
407 Mich. at 653, 288 N.W.2d at 914-15. Although this passage conflicts with the holding that 
"the sentencing court erred in attempting to determine whether that treatment would in fact 
be provided," id. at 652, 288 N.W.2d at 914, the court apparently is willing to leave the door 
open to a proceeding in which the Department of Corrections and the Department of Mental 
Health are fully represented. Only in this type of proceeding would it be possible to conclude 
that the GBMI statute is "legally inert." 
The argument that due process is violated by the failure to provide a hearing before the defendant 
receives treatment has been rejected. See People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 200, 274 N.W.2d 
17, 19 (1978). 
The issue of providing hearings before a GBMI convict is transferred to a mental institution 
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ment, the defendant is discharged from the mental health facilities, 
he is sent to the Department of Corrections to serve the balance of 
the sentence. so 
The GBMI statute also provides that treatment may be a condition 
of probation. 51 The period of probation should be at least five years 
unless the judge, after examining the psychiatric report, deems a shorter 
period to be appropriate. 52 
As the statute is written, the NGRI verdict remains an option for 
juries. Legislators apparently believed that juries would use the GBMI 
verdict despite the continued availability of the NGRI verdict. 
II. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE USE AND EFFECT 
OF THE GBMI VERDICT IN MICHIGAN 
A. Method for Empirical Study 
The sample GBMI, NGRI, and Guilty groups evaluated in this study 
were obtained through different channels. The names of all adult male 
GBMI defendants 53 who received prison sentences between 1975 and 
1981 were obtained from Jackson State Penitentiary and the Riverside 
Correctional Psychiatric Center. 54 These names were matched against 
has provoked disagreement among legal writers. One commentator, following the reasoning in 
Sharif, has argued that "[a] guilty party has no right to freedom. He is under state control 
and has little to say concerning where his sentence shall be served." Note, An Historical Analysis, 
supra note 33, at 492. In response, another writer has argued that the liberty of the defendant 
is not the sole interest involved because the commitment to a mental institution attaches an addi-
tional "distinctive stigma" to the defendant. Note, An Aggregate Approach to Madness, supra 
note 33, at 369 (quoting Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569, 573 (D. Neb. 1977), vacated and 
remanded on the issue of mootness, 436 U.S. 407 (1978)). See also Note, supra note 3, at 548. 
50. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982). 
51. Id. § 768.36(4). 
52. Id. 
53. This study is limited to the class of adult males, which constitutes approximately 750/o 
of the total arrests in Michigan over the past 10 years. No females were included in this study 
due to administrative difficulty in obtaining the names of women found GBMI. It is believed, 
however, that the number of women found GBMI is extremely small. Telephone interview with 
Ms. Donna Bergen, Superintendent of the Huron Valley Women's Facility (March 7, 1983). 
All subsequent use of the word "defendants" refers to adult male defendants. In compiling 
"adults arrested," the Michigan State Police define "adults" as individuals 16 years of age or 
older. Telephone interview with Ms. Alice Boomer, Clerk at the Uniform Crime Reports Section 
of Michigan State Police Criminal Records Center (Oct. 26, 1982). Under Michigan law, however, 
an adult is an individual who has attained the age of 18 years. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 722.52 (1982). All statistics of adults arrested are taken from records compiled by the Michigan 
State Police. See infra note 66. All GBMI and NGRI statistics, however, are for individuals 
who are at least 18 years old. Thus, the NGRI figures offered as percentages of the total popula-
tion of adults arrested are slightly - but consistently - lower than the actual number, because 
they do not include any 16- or 17-year-old individuals found NGRI. 
54. All GBMI figures were provided by Dr. John Prelesnik, Superintendent of the Reception 
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records of defendants tested for insanity at the Forensic Center. 55 The 
Forensic Center evaluated 188 of the 203 defendants found GBMI be-
tween 197 5 and 1981 ; the remaining 12 % (25) evidently were not 
evaluated despite statutory requirements. 56 Demographic statistics were 
compiled from the records of 70% (141) of those GBMI defendants 
evaluated by the Forensic Center. 57 This data forms the base of the 
demographic analysis in Part E. Although defendants adjudicated GBMI 
may be either sentenced or placed on probation, records have not been 
kept of defendants on probation; thus, it is impossible to determine 
the size or characteristics of this portion of the GBMI group. 58 
The names and histories of the 316 defendants acquitted as insane 
between 1976 and 1981 were obtained from the Forensic Center. 59 Demo-
graphic statistics were compiled from the records of 96% (302) of these 
defendants. 
Data collected concerning the adjudication of NGRI and GBMI de-
fendants and on the use of expert psychiatric witnesses is based on 
responses to questionnaires mailed to sixty randomly selected attorneys 
who represented defendants adjudicated NGRI after 197560 and sixty 
randomly selected attorneys who represented defendants in the sample 
of 141 found GBMI after 1975.61 
The Guilty group was composed of 211 defendants randomly gathered 
and Guidance Center at Jackson State Penitentiary, and Mr. Larry Levy, Admissions Assistant 
at the Riverside Correctional Psychiatric Center. 
55. The Forensic Center is mandated by statute to evaluate all defendants raising the insanity 
defense and all defendants adjudicated NORI. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050(1) (1982). 
The Forensic Center has kept records on defendants found GBMI since 1975 and defendants 
found NORI since 1972. There are no records of statewide NORI totals prior to 1972. During 
these years, individual hospitals kept their own statistics, many of which have now been discarded. 
Consequently, it is most difficult to gauge accurately the annual number of NORI acquittees 
in Michigan prior to 1972. 
56. All GBMI defendants in Michigan are required to be evaluated by the Forensic Center. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20(a)(l)-(2) (1982). 
57. This data was collected from the medical record files at the Forensic Center. Demographic 
data was not included for those defendants whose files were incomplete or unavailable. 
58. Because the insanity defense is raised most often in serious crimes, and because raising 
the insanity defense is a prerequisite to being found GBMI, it seems doubtful that a large percentage 
of those defendants found GBMI are placed on probation. See Appendix A, Table K. It is possi-
ble, however, that those defendants who are placed on probation exhibit different characteristics 
than the group sampled, and if surveyed might have altered the conclusions drawn regarding 
the characteristics of the GBMI group. 
59. All NORI names and statistics were provided by Mr. Jim Romans, Director of Forensic 
Services at the Forensic Center. 
60. Responses to this questionnaire are on file with the Journal of Law Reform. 
61. Responses to this questionnaire are on file with the Journal of Law Reform. The random-
ness of this and any other random selection processes noted and not separately footnoted was 
determined by dividing the number of cases in the sample (here, 141 GBMI defendants) by the 
number of random samples desired (here, 60). This ratio (approximately 2:1) designates how 
many cases in the computer print-out of the full sample should be skipped. In this case roughly 
every other defendant was skipped. Those defendants not skipped were matched with their respective 
lawyers, and these lawyers were surveyed. 
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from a pool of defendants tested for criminal responsibility at the Foren-
sic Center between 1976 and 1981 and not subsequently found GBMI 
or NORI. 62 Because some of these defendants might later have been 
found innocent or had their charges dropped, questionnaires regarding 
the adjudication of each defendant were mailed to the courts at which 
they were tried. Of the 139 responses received, 63 95% of the defendants 
had plea-bargained or been found guilty. 64 Thus, a high proportion 
of those defendants placed in the Guilty group were actually found 
guilty at trial. Demographic statistics were obtained from Forensic 
Center records on all 211 defendants in the Guilty group. 
B. Effect of the GBMI Verdict on the Incidence 
of the NORI Verdict 
Prior to the inception of the GBMI statute, all defendants who plea-
bargained or went to trial in Michigan received one of three verdicts: 
guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. 65 Adding the 
GBMI verdict necessarily displaced some number of defendants in one 
or more of these other groups. The effect the GBMI verdict has had 
on the NGRI verdict was estimated by comparing the proportion of 
defendants found NGRI before and after the introduction of the GBMI 
verdict. 66 
As a starting point, the percentage of individuals found NGRI and 
GBMI constitutes an extremely small part of the group of all arrestees6 ' 
- so small that it is a bit surprising how much attention the defenses 
have received. Since the enactment of the GBMI statute in 1975, only 
62. This group was selected through a matching process with the GBMI group: the number 
of GBMI defendants was calculated for each year, and a matched random sample was drawn 
from those defendants found guilty in corresponding years. A few extra guilty defendants were 
added to each year to expand the sample size; this was done purely for administrative conven-
ience in the event some files proved to be unavailable. The demographics presented for the Guil-
ty group may not be entirely representative, however, because defendants who seek testing at 
the Forensic Center before pleading guilty or being found guilty may exhibit somewhat different 
characteristics than defendants who never seek to be tested at the Forensic Center. It seems like-
ly, for example, that many defendants who seek Forensic Center testing are individuals who 
have previously had greater than average contact with mental health institutions. 
63. These responses are on file with the Journal of Law Reform. 
64. Of the seven defendants who were not found guilty, five were found not guilty, one 
was found GBMI, and one was found NORI but never reported back to the Forensic Center. 
Two other defendants were excluded because they had not yet been adjudicated. 
65. See 1927 Mich. Pub. Acts 175, c. VIII, § 29a. 
66. See Appendix A, Table A. Because a statistically significant analysis that compares raw 
numbers, as opposed to percentages of totals, can be misleading, Michigan State Police records 
of annual arrests were also gathered to determine the percentages of defendants found NORI 
out of the total number arrested. All data on adult males arrested were provided by Ms. Alice 
Boomer, Clerk at the Uniform Crime Reports Section of the Michigan State Police Criminal 
Records Center. 
67. See Appendix A, Table A. 
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241 defendants have plea-bargained GBMl68 or been found GBMI by 
a judge or jury, ranging from a low of 0.004% (11) in 1976 to a high 
of 0.023% (51) in 1977. (A percentage rate of 0.023 means a rate of 
only 23 GBMI verdicts for every 100,000 arrestees.) In the four years 
prior to the implementation of the GBMI verdict, 237 of the adult 
males charged with crimes were adjudicated NGRI: an average of 
0.025% (59) per year. Since the first full year of the GBMI statute 
in 1976, 381 of the adult males arrested were adjudicated NGRI -
an average of 0.026% (54) per year. During these years the proportion 
of defendants found NGRI out of the total number raising the defense 
has remained relatively constant, ranging from a low of 5% (1981) 
to a high of 8.4% (1977). 69 Thus, despite the change in the law, the 
rate of NGRI verdicts has remained stable over a ten-year period. 10 
This consistency over time reveals that judges and juries are continu-
ing to find defendants NGRI as often as they did prior to the GBMI 
alternative, and suggests that they are rarely entering the new verdict 
when they would previously have found a person NGRI. 
C. Adjudication of NGRI and GBMI Defendants 
The legislative history of the GBMI statute indicates that the secondary 
purpose of the new verdict was to simplif1 jury deliberations in insanity 
cases. 11 To evaluate the extent to which this goal has been achieved 
and juries have adopted the new verdict, it is necessary to examine 
how GBMI dispositions have been reached since 1975. This can be 
achieved by analyzing the percentage of a sample group of GBMI de-
fendants who obtained their dispositions through plea-bargains, bench 
trials, and jury trials. 12 As a point of reference, a similar study was 
done with a group of NGRI defendants. 73 
68. This figure does not include defendants placed on probation. 
69. See Appendix A, Table B; see also Appendix B, Chart A. 
70. The consistency in NGRI verdicts during these years does not, in itself, prove that the 
new verdict has not depleted the number of defendants who might have otherwise been found 
NGRI. It is possible, for example, that in the absence of the GBMI verdict the number of insanity 
acquittals between 1975 and 1982 would have increased. Examination of demographic data, 
however, reveals that defendants found GBMI more closely resemble defendants found guilty 
than defendants found NGRI. See infra notes 85-128 and accomp_anying text. 
71. See THIRD A.NALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, supra note 6, at 2. 
72. See Appendix A, Table C. 
73. This study was based on responses from questionnaires mailed to 120 defense attorneys. 
Half were randomly selected from those attorneys who had represented defendants found GBMI, 
and half were randomly selected from attorneys,who had represented defendants found NGRI 
since 1975. Thirty-six GBMI attorneys and 38 NGRI attorneys responded. Among the NGRI 
attorneys, five responded twice. Among the GBMI attorneys, one responded twice. All attorneys 
surveyed were successful in their respective cases; thus, those responding do not represent a more 
successful - and thereby representationally skewed - sample of those attorneys solicited. 
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Although all defendants found NGRI are necessarily adjudicated 
through courtroom proceedings, the evidence indicated that roughly 
600Jo of those found GBMI received their verdicts through a plea-
bargaining process. 74 This finding is, on the surface, quite surprising, 
because a GBMI verdict does not affect a judge's sentencing powers. 
Consequently, it seems pointless for the defendant to seek the verdict 
through a plea-bargain. Equally important, defendants found GBMI 
after trial were evenly divided between bench and jury trials. 75 This 
discovery is particularly interesting because the GBMI verdict was 
primarily designed as an extra option for the use of juries, yet in practice 
appears to be used just as often by judges. Thus, although the Michigan 
legislature created the verdict to simplify jury decision-making, only 
one in five defendants found GBMI receive that verdict from a jury. 
D. Use of Expert Psychiatric Witnesses in NGRJ and GBMI Trials 
To be found NGRI or GBMI, a defendant must first plead insanity 
and undergo a psychiatric examination at the Forensic Center. 76 At 
trial, a Forensic Center examiner will testify for or against an NGRI 
acquittal. Often, if the Forensic Center testimony is expected to be 
against a defendant, the defendant will call a private psychiatrist to 
testify on his behalf. One wa'j to gauge the influence of Forensic Center 
testimony is to compare the use of private psychiatrists and Forensic 
Center examiners as expert witnesses in NGRI and GBMI trials. 11 
Defendants found NGRI called Forensic Center examiners to testify 
in bench trials in 740Jo of their cases, but never called them to testify 
in jury trials. 78 It is actually quite logical that NGRI defendants would 
not call Forensic Center examiners to testify at jury trials. Ninety per-
cent of those defendants found NGRI were adjudicated in non-jury 
trials, 79 often through a quasi-plea-bargaining process. 80 If Forensic 
Center testimony was supportive, the defense often convinced the prose-
cutor to stipulate to the Forensic Center report and merely go through 
a pro forma bench trial. 8 1 
Defendants found GBMI, on the other hand, used Forensic Center 
examiners in bench trials only about half as often as NGRI defendants, 
but occasionally asked an examiner to take the stand in a jury trial. 82 
74. See Appendix A, Table C. 
75. Id. 
76. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.20a(l)-(2) (1982). 
77. See Appendix A, Table D. The procedure for this study is explained supra note 73. 
78. See Appendix A, Table D. 
79. See Appendix A, Table C. 
80. See Appendix A, notes to Table D. 
81. Id. 
82. See Appendix A, Table D. 
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Thus, it would generally appear that defendants found NGRI are more 
reliant upon favorable Forensic Center testimony in bench trials than 
def end ants found GBMI. · 
There is less disparity between the GBMI and NGRI defendants' 
use of private psychiatrists as expert witnesses. In bench trials, the NORI 
defendants called private psychiatrists to the stand 44% of the time 
and GBMI defendants used private psychiatrists 67% of the time. 83 
At every jury trial, however, both groups used the testimony of private 
psychiatrists. These findings suggest that NGRI defendants may char-
acteristically be more reliant upon expert testimony in bench trials, 
and that both NGRI and GBMI defendants rely heavily upon testimony 
from private psychiatrists in the absence of Forensic Center testimony. 84 
E. Demographic Analysis of GBMI, NGRI, and Guilty Groups 
The persistent number of insanity acquittals following the adoption 
of the GBMI statute strongly suggests that the GBMI verdict has not 
fulfilled the expectations of the legislators who supported it. To further 
test this conclusion, demographic variables were recorded for each de-
fendant in the GBMI, NORI, and Guilty groups. 85 By examining these 
variables, it is possible to determine whether _the GBMI group appears 
more similar to the Guilty group or to the NGRI group. If the GBMI 
group closely resembles the Guilty group, it would seem more likely 
that those defendants found GBMI would have been found guilty in 
the absence of the new verdict. The variables considered included: race, 
age, 86 location of the crime, 87 marital status, 88 education, 89 employ-
ment status, 90 occupation,9 1 prior criminal charges, 92 alcohol and drug 
83. Id. 
84. Like the GBMI defendants, the prosecution employed Forensic Center testimony in about 
half the GBMI bench trials. In contrast, though the prosecution also employed Forensic Center 
testimony in about half the NGRI bench trials, NGRI defendants used testimony from the Forensic 
Center in three-quarters of the NGRI bench trials. Unlike either defendant group, the prosecu-
tion often used testimony from the Forensic Center in jury trials. See Appendix A, notes to 
Table D. 
85. The Guilty group is a random sample of males raising the defense of insanity who were 
not found GBMI or NGRI. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. 
86. "Age" refers to the defendant's age at the time of the verdict. 
87. "Location of the crime" refers to the county in which the defendant received the verdict. 
88. "Marital status" refers to the defendant's status at the time of arrest. 
89. "Education" refers to the highest level of education achieved by the defendant prior 
to the crime. 
90. "Employment status" refers to the defendant's status at the time of arrest. 
91. "Occupation" refers to the last job held by the defendant prior to the arrest. In many 
cases, this variable is based upon the defendant's own statement as to the last job held. 
92. "Prior criminal charges" refers to the number of times the defendant has been charged 
with a crime prior to the existing charge. This figure typically came from a police report included 
in the defendant's files at the Forensic Center. In some cases, the figure was taken from the 
psychiatrist's report. 
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use, 93 prior psychiatric treatment, 94 prior Forensic Center referrals, 95 
crimes charged, 96 and Forensic Center recommendation. 97 
At the outset, a comparison was made between the demographic data 
for the NGRI group and the Guilty group. By comparing these two 
groups, it was possible to determine which variables were most signifi-
cant in differentiating between the verdicts. Discriminant analysis was 
used to determine the most important variables and to evaluate the 
designation of the significant variables. Following this comparison be-
tween the NGRI and Guilty groups, the demographic data for the GBMI 
group was analyzed, focusing on those variables found to be most 
significant in differentiating between the NGRI and Guilty groups. 98 
Finally, by using the discriminant analysis of the NGRI and Guilty 
groups, prediction tests were developed and applied to the GBMI group 
to determine whether each GBMI defendant more closely resembled 
the NGRI group or Guilty group. 
93. "Alcohol and drug use" was derived from the psychiatrist's report on the defendant's 
criminal responsibility. This report typically included a reference to any alcohol or drug use. 
According to the Forensic Center, the psychiatrist's report makes reference to alcohol or drug 
use whenever the defendant reports at least "occasional" use. Telephone interview with Dr. Harley 
Stock, Staff Psychiatrist, Center for Forensic Psychiatry (Jan. 28, 1983). When the report made 
reference to any of the drugs listed, such use was recorded. 
94. "Previous psychiatric treatmen_t" is based upon the psychiatrist's report on criminal respon-
sibility. If the report indicated any prior psychiatric treatment, including treatment on an out-
patient basis, the treatment was recorded. 
95. The Forensic Center examines individuals involved in the criminal justice system for a 
number of different reasons, including competency, criminal responsibility, and 60-day diagnostics 
for defendants in the Department of Corrections. The prior referrals variable includes each time 
the defendant has been examined by the Forensic Center for any of the above reasons prior 
to the arrest. 
96. In many cases, the defendant was charged with multiple crimes. In each such case, the 
three most serious crimes were recorded. 
97. Typically, defendants are recommended either criminally responsible or not responsible. 
See Appendix B, Chart A. Occasionally, a defendant will be recommended OBMI. For the pur-
poses of this study, defendants recommended OBMI are included under the heading of "criminally 
responsible" for two reasons. First, a OBMI verdict, as a technical matter, declares the defendant 
to be criminally responsible. See supra note 44. Second, many staff members performing criminal 
responsibility evaluations choose only between the criminally responsible and not responsible 
recommendations. The category designated "other" includes cases in which no recommendation 
was given or in which staff members disagreed to the appropriate recommendation. See supra 
note 44. 
98. One potential criticism of this approach is that, as a result of the adoption of the OBMI 
statute, the NORI population may have changed with respect to the variables considered here. 
Studies by the Forensic Center, however, reveal that the demographic characteristics of the NORI 
population have not changed since the adoption of the OBMI statute. A study published in 1975 
examined the NORI population at the Forensic Center for the period 1967-1972. See Cooke & 
Sikorski, Factors Affecting Length of Hospitalization in Persons Adjudicated Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity, 2 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 251 (1975). A later study by the 
Forensic Center examined the NORI population for the period September 1, 1974, to August 
31, 1979, and concluded that the NORI population was "quite similar" to the population of 
the earlier study. See Criss & Racine, Impact of Change in Legal Standard for Those Adjudicated 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 1975-1979, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 261, 263 
(1980). 
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I. Significant differences between the NORI group and the Guilty 
group- As a first step in comparing the NORI and Guilty groups, 
each variable was expressed in both real numbers and percentages for 
each group. 99 This simple two-way analysis produced statistically signifi-
cant differences between the two groups for every variable except marital 
stat.us, county size, occupation, comparisons between homicides and 
other crimes, and comparisons between crimes against the person and 
crimes against property. 
The most significant distinctions between the NORI and Guilty groups 
appeared in the defendants' prior contacts with mental health and 
criminal justice authorities. Although both groups had had substantial 
contact with mental health authorities, the NORI group had significantly 
more contact with the Forensic Center, 100 and with psychiatric treat-
ment in general. 101 On the other hand, the Guilty group was significantly 
more likely to have had previous criminal charges. 102 
The use of alcohol and marijuana was also much more prevalent 
in the Guilty group. 101 In addition, the Guilty group showed more use 
of "hard" drugs (illegal drugs other than marijuana). 104 The two groups 
did not differ significantly as to the crime charged, with one excep-
tion: a much higher percentage of the Guilty group was charged with 
sex-related crimes. 105 A number of other variables produced statistically 
significant distinctions. Defendants in the NORI group were more likely 
to be black, 106 older, 101 and better educated, 108 but unemployed. 109 
All of these variables produced statistically significant distinctions. 
Nevertheless, further discriminant analysis showed the recommenda-
tion of the Forensic Center to be the single most important factor in 
determining the verdict received by the defendant. In 96% of the cases 
in which the defendant was later found guilty, the Forensic Center had 
previously determined that the defendant did not meet the requirements 
of the NORI defense. 110 Similarly, in 84% of the cases in which the 
defendant was utlimately found NORI, the Forensic Center determined 
that the defendant did meet the NORI requirements. 111 
99. See Appendix A. 
100. p = .0000. See Appendix A, Table J. The p-value gives the probability that the distribu-
tion occurred by chance. Any value less than p = .05 is significant. 
101. p = .0000. See Appendix A, Table J. 
102. p = .0001. See Appendix A, Table H. 
103. See Appendix A, Table I. 
104. p = .0105. See Appendix A, Table I. 
105. p = .0000. See Appendix A, Table K. 
106. p = .0002. See Appendix A, Table E. 
107. p = .0005. See Appendix A, Table E. 
108. p = .0073. See Appendix A, Table G. 
109. p = .0060. See Appendix A, Table G. 
I 10. See Appendix A, Table L. 
111. p = .0000. See Appendix A, Table L. 
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To test further the influence of the Forensic Center recommenda-
tion, two statistical prediction tests were developed. 112 For both tests 
an evaluation group of cases was randomly drawn from the NGRI and 
Guilty groups to evaluate the reliability of the tests. 
First, a prediction test was developed based upon demographic 
variables other than the Forensic Center recommendation. 113 When this 
test was applied to the evaluation group, approximately 65% of the 
predictions for both the Guilty group and the NGRI group proved 
correct. 114 In contrast, by developing a prediction test based upon all 
the demographic data plus the Forensic Center recommendation, the 
predictions were much more successful: when applied to the evalua-
tion group, 100% accuracy was achieved for both the Guilty group 
and the NGRI group. 115 Under this analysis, the Forensic Center recom-
mendation proved to be the most significant variable. 116 
In sum, the NGRI and Guilty groups showed significant differences 
as to many variables. The most significant variables were previous 
psychiatric treatment, previous criminal justice contacts, alcohol and 
drug use, a sex-related criminal charge, and most important, the Forensic 
Center recommendation. 
2. The GBMI group- The analysis of the GBMI demographic 
variables was conducted in two steps. First, the data for the GBMI 
group was compared to the corresponding data for the NGRI and Guilty 
groups as to those variables that showed a significant distinction between 
112. Linear discriminant analysis forms a rule for the assignment of cases to categories based 
upon the data of the individual cases. Specifically, the technique attempts to find that linear 
combination of variables which maximizes the difference between the results categories, e.g., 
Guilty or NGRI. Given the data from a new case, the rule formed through the linear combina-
tion can predict the ultimate category of that case. Validation of the rule can be derived from 
the application of the rule to cases in which the actual category is known. 
113. The variables included in developing this prediction test were race, age, marital status, 
location of crime, education, employment status, previous criminal charges, previous psychiatric 













Prediction NGRI Guilty 
NGRI 10 (100.00Jo) 0 (0.0%) 
Guilty 0 (0.0%) 10 (100.00Jo) 
116. p = .0000, See Appendix A, Table L. Further evidence of the importance of the recom-
mendation variable can be found in the close correlation between the variables that are important 
in distinguishing between verdicts and the variables that are important in distinguishing between 
the criminally responsible and not responsible recommendations. Discriminant analysis established 
that the existence of a sex-related charge, the use of hard drugs, the number of prior criminal 
charges, and the defendant's race and education were the most significant variables in distinguishing 
between recommendations. These variables are virtually identical to those determined to be im-
portant in distinguishing verdicts. The only exception to this correlation is that the existence 
of prior psychiatric treatment is less significant in distinguishing recommendations. 
FALL 1982] GBMI Project 99 
the NGRI and Guilty groups. Second, using the prediction tests devel-
oped in the discriminant analysis of the NGRI and Guilty groups, the 
entire GBMI group was tested to see whether each GBMI defendant 
more closely resembled the composite of the NGRI or Guilty group. 
For most of the variables that significantly differentiated the NGRI 
group from the Guilty group, the GBMI group tended to resemble the 
Guilty group more than the NGRI group. Typical of the similarity be-
tween the GBMI group and the Guilty group was the alcohol and drug 
use variable. 111 In the case of each individual drug - including alcohol 
- the percentage of users in the GBMI group was within 5% of the 
corresponding percentage for the Guilty group. These user percentages 
were significantly higher than the corresponding user rates for the NGRI 
group. 
The GBMI group also included a greater percentage of sex-related 
crimes than the NGRI group. 118 Thus, the existence of a sex-related 
charge appears to greatly decrease the chances of an NGRI verdict. 
Other significant variables in which the GBMI group more closely 
resembled the Guilty group included: fewer instances of prior psychiatric 
treatment, 119 more prior criminal charges, 120 less unemployment, 121 and 
less education. 122 With respect to the race variable, the GBMI group 
fell between the NGRI and Guilty groups. 123 
With respect to two variables, the GBMI group more closely re-
sembled the NGRI group. Like the NGRI group, the GBMI group 
tended to be older than the Guilty group. 124 Similarly, like the NGRI 
group, people in the GBMI group tended to have a greater number 
of prior referrals to the Forensic Center than the Guilty group. 125 
Although the GBMI group more closely resembled the Guilty group 
for most variables, the most significant variable again proved to be 
the Forensic Center recommendation. In a comparison between groups 
on the recommendation variable, the GBMI group was similar to the 
Guilty group, and both were vastly different from the NGRI group. 126 
Although more than 83% of those defendants found NGRI were recom-
mended "not responsible" by the Forensic Center, only 11.7% of the 
GBMI group and 4.3% of the Guilty group were recommended "not 
responsible.'' 121 
117. See Appendix A, Table I. 
118. See Appendix A, Table K. 
119. See Appendix A, Table J. 
120. See Appendix A, Table H. 
121. See Appendix A, Table G. 
122. See Appendix A, Table G. 
123. See Appendix A, Table E. 
124. See Appendix A, Table E. 
125. See Appendix A, Table J. 
126. See Appendix A, Table L. 
127. See Appendix A, Table L. 
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The importance of the Forensic Center recommendation was further 
demonstrated by applying the prediction tests derived from the demo-
graphic data for the NORI and Guilty groups. 128 Under the prediction 
test derived from all the demographic variables excluding the Forensic 
Center recommendation, 57.4% of the GBMI group was predicted to 
have fallen into the Guilty group if guilty and NORI were the only 
verdict choices. Correspondingly, 42.6% of the GBMI group was 
predicted to have fallen into the NORI group under this test. By in-
cluding the For·ensic Center recommendation in formulating the predic-
tion test, 72.3% of the GBMI group was predicted to have fallen into 
the Guilty group while only 27.7% of the GBMI group was predicted 
to have fallen into the NORI group. 
It is important to note the limitations of these prediction tests. The 
prediction tests are based on the similarity of demographic variables. 
It is not appropriate to conclude, for example, that, in the absence 
of the GBMI verdict, 72.3% of the GBMI defendants would in fact 
have been found guilty while 27.7% would have been found NORI. 
Such precision is not possible because the variables used to develop 
the tests do not encompass all of the variables considered by a judge 
or jury in determining the appropriate verdict for the defendant or 
by the Forensic Center in making a recommendation. Nevertheless, 
it can be concluded from the aggregate of the variables recorded, that 
the majority of the GBMI defendants were more similar to the Guilty 
group than to the NORI group. It is thus likely that at least a majority 
of the GBMI defendants would have been found guilty in the absence 
of the GBMI statute. 
Ill. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MICHIGAN GBMI VERDICT 
A. Effect of the GBMI Verdict on the NGRI Verdict 
A common prediction of both critics and proponents of the statute 
was that the GBMI verdict would not merely displace some number 
of defendants found NORI, it would actually result in the elimina-
tion of the insanity defense. 129 Indeed, commentators have already sur-
mised that those defendants found GBMI since the introduction of 
128. See supra note 112. 
129. One of the first groups to voice this fear was the American Civil Liberties Union, which 
contended throughout the legislative hearings that the new statute denied defendants due process 
of law because it encroached upon the insanity defense. MICH. HOUSE LEG. ANALYSIS SECTION, 
SECOND ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, 78th Leg. (June 11, 1975). See also Note, supra note 
3, at 551 ("[I]nsanity acquittals will decline in number as the GBMI verdict becomes available. 
[It is) difficult to see how some defendants who had no criminal intent at the time of their 
criminal act will not be sent to prison."). 
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the statute would probably have been found NORI in the absence of 
the OBMI option. 130 
There is no evidence from the first seven years of the statute's ex-
istence to support this conclusion. If the OBMI verdict were being used 
as an NORI substitute, the proportion of defendants found NORI since 
the new verdict went into effect should have decreased roughly in pro-
portion to the number of individuals found OBMI. Indeed, if the OBMI 
verdict were eradicating the insanity defense, the percentage of NORI 
acquittees should have decreased each year after 1975, as the OBMI 
verdict became more well-known and its use more widespread among 
prosecutors and defense attorneys in the Michigan courts. No such trend 
can be detected. As indicated above, prior to the introduction of the 
OBMI statute, 0.024% of the adult males arrested were found NORI; 
in 1982, seven years after the OBMI statute was enacted, 0.032% of 
the adult males arrested were adjudicated NGRI. These figures contro-
vert the prediction that the OBMI verdict would cause the demise of 
the insanity defense; the number of defendants found NORI seems 
unaffected by the number of defendants found OBMI. To the extent 
that the insanity defense remains unaffected by the OBMI verdict, the 
OBMI statute has failed to meet its goal of reducing NORI acquittals. 131 
B. Effect of the GBMI Verdict on the Guilty Group 
Because NORI acquittals have not decreased, OBMI convictions must 
be replacing defendants who, before the OBMI option existed, would 
130. One proponent of the statute claims that by 1978 he had already heard of "21 cases 
where pleas to GBMI were offered and accepted in lieu of almost certain NORI verdicts." Robey, 
supra note 29, at 379-80. According to Terrence Boyle, Chief of the Criminal Division of the 
Wayne County Prosecutor's Office, most defendants found GBMI since 1976 would probably 
have been acquitted as NORI if jurors had not had the additional option. Swickard, Verdict 
out on mentally ill verdict, Detroit Free Press, Sept. 28, 1982, at A3, col. 2, at AlO, col. 2; 
see also Slovenko, The Case Against "Guilty but Mentally Ill," Detroit Free Press, Feb. 14, 
1983, at All, col. I ("The GBMI verdict is reducing the number of NORI pleas as well as 
NORI verdicts."). 
131. It is possible that a similar end may be reached by combining the GBMI verdict with 
other social reforms or changes - such as an aroused public consciousness of the abuse of the 
insanity defense. There would be, for example, a reduced likelihood of releasing another murderer 
like McGee if the defendants adjudicated NORI between 1976 and 1982 exhibited different 
characteristics than those found NORI prior to 1976. This would be the case if most defendants 
found NORI prior to 1976 were charged with serious felonies, and most, or at least a significantly 
larger number of defendants found NORI after 1976, were charged with Jess severe offenses. 
Recent studies, however, indicate that the demographic characteristics of NORI defendants have 
not changed since 1975. See supra note 98. 
The conclusion that the NORI verdict has not been diminished by the introduction of the 
GBMI verdict is subject to the charge that the number of NGRI's might have grown in the 
absence of the new verdict, and that the GBMI verdict has therefore been successful to the extent 
that it has prevented such growth. See supra note 70. There may be merit to this claim, but, 
in the absence of any data indicating such a trend, it does not seem likely. 
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have been found guilty or not guilty. The GMBI verdict, however, re-
quires a finding or an admission that the person committed the crime 
charged: thus, it is more likely that the guilty verdict is being displaced 
by the GBMI verdict. 
This hypothesis is supported by comparing ho\Y GBMI and NGRI 
verdicts have been reached since 1976. This study has revealed that 
over 60% of those found GBMI received their verdict through a plea-
bargain, whereas all defendants pleading NGRI were, necessarily, ad-
judicated through courtroom proceedings. 132 These plea-bargains are 
surprising because sentencing under a GBMI plea is no different from 
sentencing under a guilty plea. 133 One explanation for this behavior 
is that many defendants using the GBMI plea may never intend to 
be found NGRI in a courtroom proceeding, but merely want to use 
the implicit threat of pleading NGRI at trial as a bargaining chip for 
a shortened sentence. 134 A prosecutor is not likely to take the threat 
of an NGRI plea very seriously, however, when over 80% of those 
132. The statement that all defendants found NGRI were adjudicated through courtroom 
proceedings is somewhat misleading because it suggests that there was an adversarial process 
in these proceedings. Often, the NGRI trial is merely an uncontested formality that has much 
of the flavor of a plea-bargain. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
133. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982). 
134. Dr. Robey, Executive Director of the Michigan Forensic Services from 1967-1975, argues 
that this bargaining scenario is the greatest asset of the GBMI verdict, because it provides the 
opportunity to offer probation as an alternative to imprisonment: 
In the case of a defendant who has an NGRI defense which is supported even by the 
prosecutor's psychiatrist, and who is likely to be released as uncommittable, the GBMI 
plea allows the prosecutor to offer probation with treatment. The defendant is assured 
of his disposition, and the public is assured that there will be a five-year period where 
follow-up and treatment will be mandatory. If the prubationer refuses to continue treat-
ment, the prosecutor may institute probation violation proceedings. If the probationer 
becomes acutely psychotic, he can be civilly committed or may even be induced to enter 
a mental hospital as a "voluntary" admission by being offered prison as an alternative. 
Robey, supra note 29, at 379. 
This analysis of the plea-bargaining situation, however, assumes that in the absence of the 
GBMI verdict the defendant would probably be found NGRI. Data indicating that the number 
of NGRI verdicts have remained static since the introduction of the GBMI verdict suggests that 
the prosecution has not used the GBMI verdict to this effect. 
From the defendant's perspective, it is also unclear that plea-bargaining GBMI would be of 
greater value than offering a guilty plea. The stigma attached to prisoners needing mental health 
care may keep such individuals from being paroled as early as other inmates who pleaded guilty 
to the same offense. See Interview with Dr. Ames Robey, Executive Director of the Michigan 
Forensic Services from 1967-1975, in Ann Arbor, Michigan (Oct. 6, 1981) ("There are many 
people who are mentally ill who don't want it on their criminal record, and with good reason. 
Parole boards are much more hesitant to release prisoners known to have had mental problems."). 
See also supra notes 16 & 17 (addressing issue of stigma associated with mental illness defenses). 
But see Interview with Dr. John Prelesnik, Superintendent of the Reception and Guidance Center 
at Jackson State Penitentiary, in Jackson, Michigan (Sept. 15, 1981) ("We're in a political arena 
now, so the reality of the situation has no purpose. The law really does not effect minimum 
parole or treatment.") [hereinafter cited as Prelesnik Interview]. The ultimate value of the plea-
bargaining process can only be shown through a comparative study of the sentencing of defendants 
who have plea-bargained guilty, with those who have plea-bargained GBMI. 
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found GBMI have been certified as responsible by the Forensic Center. 135 
Another possible explanation is that judges are more lenient in the 
sentences· they impose on GBMI defendants, or that counsel believe 
that even though a client with a GBMI verdict is given as long a sentence 
as a defendant found guilty, he will be more likely to receive mental 
health care in the prison system. Finally, a cynical explanation is that 
a GBMI plea results from defense counsel deluding their clients about 
an imagined advantage of a GBMI verdict. The verdict creates an illu-
sion of victory. 
Demographic evidence supports the conclusion that defendants now 
being adjudicated GBMI would probably have been found guilty, not 
NGRI, in the absence of the GBMI statute. The GBMI and Guilty 
groups closely resembled each other in most of the variables that 
distinguished the NGRI and Guilty groups. The GBMI and Guilty 
groups had more drug and alcohol users, more sex-related charges, 
less prior psychiatric treatment, more prior criminal charges, less 
unemployment, and less education. Further, through the use of the 
prediction tests developed through discriminant analysis, most of those 
defendants found GBMI were predicted to have been found guilty in 
the absence of the GBMI alternative. The similarity of the GBMI and 
Guilty groups, combined with the observation that the same number 
of defendants are presently being found NGRI as prior to the introduc-
tion of the GBMI verdict, strongly suggests that the GBMI verdict has 
simply created a new class of individuals, the vast majority of whom, 
prior to 1975, would probably have been found guilty. 
C. The Role of the Forensic Center 
This study also concludes that Michigan's Center for Forensic 
Psychiatry wields considerable power in determining the verdict in in-
sanity cases. Three separate parts of the study support this conclusion. 
First, the Forensic Center recommendation variable revealed a close 
correlation between a recommendation of ''not responsible'' and an 
NORI verdict. A recommendation of "criminally responsible" sub-
stantially reduced the chances of receiving an NGRI verdict. Second, 
the recommendation variable had a substantial impact on the success 
rate of prediction tests developed through discriminant analysis. Predic-
tion tests developed without the recommendation variable achieved only 
a 65% accuracy rate; tests using the recommendation variable achieved 
100% accuracy. 
Third, data concerning the type of trial and the use of expert 
psychiatric witnesses reflected the power of the Forensic Center. A 
135. See Appendix A, Table L. 
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random sample of NORI verdicts showed that the vast majority of 
those found NORI came from bench trials. Moreover, the majority 
of the bench trials included Forensic Center staff members testifying 
on behalf of the defense. According to the staff of the Forensic Center, 
bench trials in which the Forensic Center testifies on behalf of the 
defense typically are cases in which both the defense and the prosecu-
tion tacitly agree that an NORI verdict would be appopriate. 136 This 
pro forma agreement appears to be the result of the statutory duty 
of the Forensic Center to examine the defendant on behalf of the state. 
A prosecutor faced with a "not responsible" recommendation from 
the Forensic Center is not likely to contest the case vigorously. Conse-
quently, the Forensic Center's role as examiner in all insanity cases 
could be the primary reason that the NORI verdict has survived in 
significant numbers. 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
Proponents and critics of the OBMI verdict anticipated that the ver-
dict would cause a substantial decrease in the number of NORI ac-
quittals. An empirical analysis of the OBMI verdict indicates that the 
verdict is not functioning as expected. The NORI verdict continues 
to be used in Michigan courts. Thus, to the extent the OBMI verdict 
was intended to decrease NORI acquittals, it has failed. 
Three additional conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, 
most defendants found OBMI would probably have received guilty ver-
dicts in the absence of the OBMI statute. Second, although the verdict 
was designed for jury trials, over 600Jo of those defendants found OBMI 
have come through plea-bargains and another 200Jo have come from 
bench trials. Finally, the use of a state-operated Forensic Center is an 
influential factor in any case in which insanity is raised as a defense. 
For this reason, states that do not possess a facility like the Michigan 
Forensic Center may not have the same experience with the OBMI 
statute as Michigan. 
POSTSCRIPT 
This study has shown that despite the introduction of the OBMI 
verdict, the insanity defense has survived in Michigan. Yet, the real 
impact of the OBMI verdict may be in the post-conviction stage rather 
than at trial. As a practical matter, the OBMI prisoner is not more 
likely to receive mental health treatment than the prisoner with a simple 
136. See Benedek Interview, supra note 16. See also Appendix A, Table D notes (observing 
trial court stipulations to Forensic Center testimony). 
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guilty verdict; 137 the GBMI prisoner in Michigan is tested and evaluated 
like any other prisoner. 138 Thus, the danger of a GBMI statute rests 
not in the potential for jury compromise in insanity cases, but instead 
in the possible misconception among defendants that a GBMI verdict 
is in some way "better" than a guilty verdict. 139 To alleviate such a 
misconception and ensure that the defendant can make an educated 
choice whether to proceed with the insanity defense, it is crucial- that 
the defendant be informed of the practical effects of a GBMI verdict. 
Ironically, the GBMI statute ultimately may have a beneficial effect 
on mental health treatment in the prison system, as those GBMI 
prisoners who enter corrections expecting help and do not receive treat-
ment will highlight the inadequacies of the system. 140 The mere addi-
tion of the label "guilty but mentally ill" will not correct the extensive 
problems of mental health care within the nation's prisons; however, 
by focusing attention on these problems the GBMI statute may pro-
137. In one Michigan study, over 750/o of the defendants found GBMI received no mental 
treatment and the majority of the others had only occasional check-ups from a corrections depart-
ment psychiatrist. Press, supra note 5, at 56, 60. According to Ralph Slovenko, Professor of 
Law and Psychiatry at Wayne State University, the defendant found GBMI is handled and treated 
just like any other convicted person. Slovenko Letter, supra note 33, at Al4, col. 4 (citing the 
case of an inmate found GBMI who had spent four years in prison with no psychiatric care). 
See also, Swickard, supra note 130, at AIO. 
Even before the GBMI verdict was available, corrections officials were required by statute 
to conduct psychological tests on defendants committed to any of their facilities and to recom-
mend placement for those defendants in need of mental health care. See 1960 Mich. Pub. Acts 
103, § I (current version at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.267 (1982)). The Michigan criminal 
code also requires psychological evaluation and provides civil commitment procedures for those 
found guilty of violent felonies and sex crimes. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.268 (1982). 
Because the GBMI statute requires treatment only when "psychiatrically indicated" by such testings, 
id. § 768.36(3), the verdict does not guarantee the GBMI prisoner mental health care. 
138. Dr. John Prelesnik, Superintendent of the Reception and Guidance Center at Jackson 
State Penitentiary, states that "in reality GBMI prisoners are treated like any other prisoners; 
they will get extra treatment if they need it, but that's the same treatment we give everyone 
else." Prelesnik Interview, supra note 134. In this respect, Prelesnik views the GBMI verdict 
as no more than "a crazy plea bargain." Id.; see also supra note 49. 
Testing at Jackson State Penitentiary has revealed that upon entering prison, only 500/o of 
those defendants diagnosed as GBMI show signs of mental disorders. Letter from John Prelesnik, 
Superintendent of the Reception and Guidance Center at Jackson State Penitentiary, to John 
Mortiz (Feb. 26, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). See also supra note 49. 
In addition, other states have held that all mentally ill prisoners possess a constitutional right 
to treatment while incarcerated. See, e.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), 
vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); State in Interest of R.G.W., 145 N.J. Super. 
167, 366 A.2d 1375 (1976); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 
509 (1975). If this right were clearly recognized, the distinguishing feature between a guilty and 
a GBMI verdict - the right to treatment - would be merely illusory. 
139. The high percentage of defendants who plea-bargain for a GBMI verdict (as opposed 
to being found GBMI by a court or jury) implies that at least some defendants have been counseled 
to believe that a GBMI verdict is superior to a guilty verdict. 
140. "[P]roper application of a guilty but mentally ill verdict requires that states commit 
the necessary resources to house and treat those recommended for psychiatric supervision. If 
we are serious about treating the ills of the insanity laws, we must be willing to pay the medical 
_bills for the cures." Kaufman, supra note 5, at 19. 
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vide the impetus necessary to improve the treatment of the mentally 
ill criminal. 

















Distribution of NGRI and GBMI by Year 
Percent of 
Male Adults Adult Males 




250,251 4* 56 
263,513 11 0.004% 32 
222,803 51 0.023% 47 
198,969 17 0.009% 51 
191,857 41 0.020% 68 
197,362 39 0.020% 64 
215,449 40 0.019% 54 
















*Figure reflects only last three months of year. 
tFigure is projected total for year based on average of preceeding months for which records 
are available. There were a total of 100,372 adult males arrested in the first six months of 1982. 
TABLE B 
Criminal ResQonsibility Evaluations 
Number & Number & 
CR Percent Found Percent Found 
Year Evaluations NGRI GBMI 
1976 401 32 (8.0%) 11 (2.7%) 
1977 561 47 (8.4%) 51 (9.1 OJo) 
1978 746 51 (6.8%) 17 (2.3%) 
1979 948 68 (7 .20Jo) 41 (4.0%) 
1980 1122 64 (5.7%) 39 (3.4%) 
1981 1082 54 (5.0%) 40 (3.7%) 
1982 1060 65 (6.1%) 38 (3.6%) 
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TABLE C 
Adjudication of NGRI and GBMI Defendants 
GBMI (Total= 36) 
NGRI (Total= 38) 
Plea 














(1) Expert Witnesses: Defense 
Forensic Center Testimony 






Bench Trial Jury Trial 
4/6 (670/o)** 7/7 (1000/o)** 
15/34 (440Jo)tt 4/4 (lO0OJo)tt 
(2) Expert Witness: Prosecution 
Forensic Center Testimony 
Bench Trial Jury Trial 
3/6 (50%) 
16/34 (47%) 
5/7 (71 OJo) 
4/4 (100%) 
*At one GBMI bench trial, the Forensic Center's report was admitted by stipulation without 
the presence of a forensic examiner. In those trials in which the defense called for testimony 
from the Forensic Center, the prosecution never offered opposing testimony. 
••If the defense only used testimony of an independent examiner, the prosecution matched that 
testimony with testimony from the Forensic Center eight out of nine times. 
In only two of 13 bench trials did neither side rely on testimony from the Forensic Center. 
tAt eight NGRI bench trials, the Forensic's report was admitted by stipulation without the presence 
of a forensic examiner. Where the defense called for Forensic Center testimony, the prosecution 
offered opposing testimony in only eight out of 24 cases. In at least four of these cases it appears 
that this was done for form only. In one case the defense called no witnesses and the prosecution 
called a forensic examiner to testify that the defendant was insane. 
ttlf the defense only presented the testimony of an independent examiner, the prosecution matched 
that testimony with testimony from the Forensic Center 10 out of 11 times. 
Testimony from the Forensic Center was relied on by one or both sides in all but one case. 
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TABLE E 
Age and Race 
Variable GBMI NGRI Guilty 
Race 
White 87 (61.7%) 161 (53.3%) 146 (69.5%) 
Black 51 (36.2%) 138 (45.7%) 59 (28.1 OJo) 
Other 3 (2.1%) 3 (1.0%) 5 (2.4%) 
Age 
21 & under 14 (10.1 %) 23 (8.7%) 50 (23 .9%) 
22-30 63 (45.3%) 118 (45.0%) 87 (41.6%) 
31-40 40 (28.8%) 75 (28.6%) 43 (20.6%) 
41 & over 22 (15.8%) 46 (17.5%) 19 (13.8%) 
TABLE F 
Crime Location 
Urban-Rural GBMI NGRI Guilty 
(by county population) 
Less than 50,000 15 (10.6%) 27 (8.9%) 31 (14.7%) 
50,000-100,000 5 (3.5%) 8 (2.6%) 12 (5.7%) 
100, 000-400 ,000 28 (19.9%) 69 (26.2%) 58 (27.5%) 
More than 400,000 93 (66.0%) 159 (60.5%) 110 (52.1%) 
Particular Counties 
Bay 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.3%) 11 (5.2%) 
Genesee 4 (2.8%) 11 (3.6%) 21 (10.0%) 
Grand Traverse 0 (0.0%) 6 (2.0%) 3 (1.4%) 
Ingham 7 (5.0%) 8 (2.6%) 6 (2.8%) 
Jackson 1 (0.7%) 9 (3.0%) 4 (1.9%) 
Kalamazoo 3 (2.1%) 12 (4.0%) 2 (0.9%) 
Kent 11 (7.8%) 26 (8.6%) 17 (8.1 OJo) 
Macomb 4 (2.8%) 11 (3.6%) 13 (6.2%) 
Monroe 3 (2.1 %) 8 (2.6%) 4 (1.9%) 
Oakland 9 (6.4%) 32 (10.6%) 15 (7 .1 OJo) 
Saginaw 5 (3.5%) 8 (2.6%) 11 (5.2%) 
Washtenaw 3 (2.1%) 32 (10.6%) 10 (4.7%) 
Wayne 65 (46.1 %) 105 (34.8%) 44 (20.9%) 
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TABLE G 
ExQeriential Variables 
Variable GBMI NGRI Guilty 
Marital Status 
Single 61 (44.2%) 174 (57.6%) 115 (55.0%) 
Married 30 (21.7%) 46 (15.2%) 36 (17.2%) 
Divorced/Separated 39 (28.2%) 66 (21.9%) 52 (24.9%) 
Other 8 (5.8%) 16 (5.3%) 6 (2.9%) 
Education 
0-6 6 (4.3%) 18 (6.2%) 10 (5.0%) 
7-11 73 (52.9%) 115 (40.1 %) 122 (60.8%) 
High School Graduate 31 (22.5%) 96 (33.6%) 50 (24.9%) 
Some College 20 (14.5%) 39 (13.6%) 17 (8.5%) 
College Graduate 3 (2.2%) 8 (2.8%) 2 (1.0%) 
Postgraduate 5 (3.5%) 10 (3.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
EmQloyment Status 
Employed 51 (36.2%) 71 (23.8%) 58 (27.9%) 
Unemployed 80 (56.7%) 211 (70.8%) 123 (59.1 %) 
Unknown/Retired 10 (7.1 %) 16 (5.4%) 28 (13.0%) 
OccuQation 
Blue Collar 131 (94.9%) 191 (93.2%) 194 (98.0%) 
White Collar 7 (5.1%) 14 (6.8%) 4 (2.0%) 
TABLE H 
Prior Criminal Charges 
Number of GBMI NGRI Guilty 
Prior Charges 
None 30 (22.2%) 112 (41.5%) 30 (15.8%) 
1-3 54 (40.1 %) 125 (46.4%) 102 (53.7%) 
4-5 23 (17.0%) 23 (8.2%) 28 (14.7%) 
6 or more 28 (20.7%) 11 (4.2%) 30 (15.7%) 
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TABLE I 
Drug Use 
Drug Use* GBMI NGRI Guilty 
Alcohol 105 (80.20Jo) 111 (42.20Jo) 156 (73.90Jo) 
Amphetamines 29 (20.60Jo) 34 (12.00Jo) 52 (24.60Jo) 
Hallucinogens 53 (40.40Jo) 51 (25.00Jo) 72 (39.lOJo) 
Barbiturates 31 (22.1 OJo) 25 (12.30Jo) 38 (20.60Jo) 
Marijuana 66 (46.80Jo) 66 (25.1 %) 8 (46.40Jo) 
PCP 31 (22.0%) 25 (9.5%) 45 (21.30Jo) 
Heroin 24 (17.0%) 25 (9.5%) 41 (19.40Jo) 
No drug use noted 18 (12.8%) 31 (11.8%) 13 (6.20Jo) 
Hard Drug Use** 
User of hard drugs 64 (48.90Jo) 63 (35.6%) 90 (48.90Jo) 
Non-user of hard drugs 67 (51.1%) 114 (64.4%) 94 (51.1%) 
*See explanation of term supra note 93. 
**The "Hard Drug" category does not include alcohol or marijuana. 
TABLE J 
Previous Psychiatric Contacts 
Forensic Center Referrals 
GBMI NGRI Guilty 
None 49 (35.00Jo) 45 (40.5%) 143 (67.8%) 
1-3 78 (55.80Jo) 54 (48.6%) 62 (29.4%) 
4 oi: more 13 (9.20Jo) 12 (10.8%) 6 (2.8%) 
Psychiatric Treatment 
GBMI NGRI Guilty 
Some Treatment 70 (49.6%) 213 (81.60Jo) 107 (50.7%) 
No Treatment 44 (31.2%) 46 (17.6%) 87 (41.2%) 
Unknown 27 (19.1%) 2 (0.8%) 17 (8.1%) 
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TABLE K 
Criminal Charges 
GBMI NGRI Guilty 
Open murder 5 (3.5%) 28 (9.3%) 12 (5.7%) 
Murder I 26 (18.4%) 24 (7.9%) 20 (9.5%) 
Murder II 11 (7.8%) 14 (4.6%) 4 (1.9%) 
Manslaughter 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.6%) 1 (0.5%) 
Assault with intent to 
commit murder 23 (16.3%) 49 (16.2%) 26 (12.3%) 
Assault with intent to 
commit great bodily 
harm 5 (3.5%) 23 (7.6%) 7 (3.3%) 
Felonious assault 10 (7 .1 % ) 45 (14.9%) 26 (12.3%) 
Assault with intent to 
commit criminal 
sexual conduct 5 (3.5%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (1.4%) 
Criminal sexual conduct 34 (24.1 %) 20 (6.6%) 41 (19.4%) 
Kidnapping 5 (3.5%) 2 (0.6%) 6 (2.8%) 
Arson 4 (2.8%) 13 (4.3%) 5 (2.4%) 
Armed robbery 23 (16.3%) 27 (8.9%) 20 (9.5%) 
Unarmed robbery 2 (1.4%) 3 (1.0%) 1 (0.5%) 
Breaking and entering 13 (9.2%) 28 (9.3%) 45 (21.3%) 
Larceny 2 (1.4%) 10 (3.3%) 16 (7.6%) 
Concealing stolen 
property 2 (1.4%) 2 (0.6%) 3 (1.4%) 
Carrying a concealed 
weapon 12 (8.5%) 33 (10.9%) 23 (10.9%) 
Unlawfully driving 
away an automobile 5 (3.5%) 12 (4.0%) 10 (4.7%) 
Child cruelty 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.3%) 2 (0.9%) 
Malicious destruction 
of property 3 (2.1%) 10 (3.3%) 5 (2.3 % ) 
Other felonies 15 (10.6%) 11 (3.6%) 14 (6.6%) 
Misdemeanors 1 (0.7%) 5 (1.7%) 2 (0.9%) 
TyQes of Crimes 
Homicides 41 (29.7%) 55 (21.0%) 36 (17.1 %) 
Non-homicides 97 (70.3%) 207 (79.0%) 175 (82.9%) 
Sex-related crimes 37 (26.8%) 17 (6.5%) 41 (19.4%) 
Non-sex-related crimes 101 (73.2%) 245 (93.5%) 170 (80.6%) 
Crimes against persons 118 (85.5%) 192 (73.3%) 143 (67.8%) 
Crimes against property 20 (14.5%) 70 (26.7%) 68 (32.2%) 
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TABLE L 
Forensic Center Recommendation 
Recommendation 
Criminally Responsible 







14 (15.4%) 202 (95.7%) 
76 (83.5%) 9 (4.3%) 
1 (1.1%) 0 (0.0%) 
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APPENDIX B 
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